

13 November 1968

Draft Transmittal

From D/OSR to DD/I

SUBJECT: Projections for Military Planning

1. I reviewed the probable requirements and current procedures and product relating to intelligence projections for military planning.

2. The need for some sort of future projections seems fairly certain because of long lead times involved in the provision of new weapons systems. As matters stand now the current NIPP effort under USIB auspices has considerable merit. I believe, however, that you might wish to consider certain improvements which might redound to the benefit of this type of projection if responsibility were turned over to your Directorate.

3. At modest additional cost to you I could chair a joint CIA/Defense Council for Projections for Planning established by the DCI and the Secretary of Defense. This interdepartmental Council, guided by existing NIEs, could relieve USIB of the onerous, and perhaps improper, task of providing detailed projections for a decade hence. These projections

are not strictly either estimates or intelligence, but they are quasi-intelligence of great value for planning, and the Community is the place where they should be made.

4. The loss under my proposal would be USIB concurrence in the final product. The interdepartmental nature of the approval of the Council's product should, however, be an authoritative enough basis for planning if used in conjunction with the National Intelligence Estimates.

5. The gains would come primarily from the decreased formality and greater flexibility of the Council. It could react more quickly to changing requirements, a consideration particularly important at this juncture. It could provide, if desired, a more current basis for JCS planning which now proceeds on the basis of a year old NIPP. Also it could provide much needed background support to US NATO. It could experiment more with new methods.

6. A discussion of the pros and cons which led to my conclusion and recommendation is attached.

B.C.C.

6 November 1968

Longer Range Projections of Sino-Soviet
Military Forces

The Military Planner's Requirement

1. The Pentagon's requirement for detailed statements of future Communist military forces -- intelligence assumptions or projections for planning, alternative force projections, threat models and the like -- stems from the need to cope with long lead times, to provide quantitative solutions, and to make decisions with the inherent uncertainties about the future explicitly in mind. *This need, ~~was~~ always present in some degree, was institutionalized under procedures established by Secretary McNamara.*

2. Modern weapon systems are ~~very~~ complex and continue to push against the boundaries of our knowledge. These systems, particularly the major ones, continue to have long lead times -- continue to require as much as 8-10 years from decision to develop to completion of full scale deployment. The budgetary lead time itself is a matter of 18-24 months. The process of development and testing is often a matter of 3-5 years. Production, procurement and full scale deployment may also be a matter of 3-5 years. There

are no indications that lead times will diminish. Even in the event of strategic missile limitation agreements, with research and development unfettered, lead time will continue to be a fact of life the military planner will have to face.

3. There is a significant cost dimension to lead time considerations, too. If planners can optimize the pace of a major program with some confidence, the program's total cost for R&D, training and production of equipment will be considerably less than if the same program were pursued on a crash basis, particularly if phases of the program, which properly should be carried out sequentially, are carried out concurrently.

4. Quantification is at the heart of the planning, decision-making, and budgeting process. The Congress must authorize a definite number of dollars, to provide a definite number of strategic missiles, to assure a sufficient number of missiles surviving an all out Soviet attack (of a definite size) to destroy such a substantial fraction of the Soviet population and industrial capacity that it would be folly for the Soviets to launch the attack in the

first place. Too few would be worthless; too many would be wasteful of assets which could be employed profitably elsewhere.

5. The future, especially the longer term future is inherently uncertain. In the military sphere this is particularly true. In the early stages of system development, intelligence observables are very infrequent in their occurrence and, typically, ambiguous to boot. The enemy has the same problem. Each side is keeping for itself as many choices available as it can. There are inevitable time lags before the intelligence becomes clear enough to depict the enemy position with high confidence.

The combination of development and deployment lead times and intelligence information lags make meaningful military planning extremely difficult in a number of important instances. Nothing in the cards suggests that this state of affairs will diminish in the future. Indeed, it is arguable that prospective changes in military capabilities may be less readily observable and, therefore, intelligence information lag times may increase.

The Dilemma

6. One solution -- high confidence single value quantified estimates of the enemy's posture a decade hence -- is and probably will not be available, generally, to the military planner.

7. Another solution could be to develop counters to all possible enemy weapon systems. Such solution is impractical because most major systems are and can be expected to continue to be expensive to develop. To attempt to insure against all possible eventualities would cost astronomical sums because of the large number of technically feasible options available.

8. The practical solution is to approximate what is required -- to consider all relevant Soviet courses of action, to make the informed judgments about those courses which can be discarded as unlikely and, correspondingly, those possible courses which must be kept under consideration as likely. This results in detailed statements of all Soviet military forces year by year for about a decade into the future.

9. Each entry, however, is ranged to make uncertainty explicit. In the NIPP the confidence interval these ranges represent -- 75 percent, likely

three chances out of four -- are considerably lower than the more desirable 90 percent, nine chances out of ten. Perhaps more unfortunately, the ranges tend to be rather wide even at the lower confidence interval, requiring the planner to keep a rather sizeable number of options under consideration.

10. In the terminology of the Secretary of Defense's Draft Presidential Memorandum "even against the high NIE estimated threat, the US Assured Destruction Capability is much greater than the 20 to 25% which I (the Secretary) believe is needed for deterrence against a Soviet first strike." . . . "If we could be sure that Soviet forces would stay within the range of the NIE -- both in quality and numbers -- we could consider smaller strategic forces" . . . "The vital importance of our Assured Destruction capability to our national security requires us to be prepared to cope with Soviet strategic threats greater than those which the NIE projects" . . . "To insure that these threats remain unlikely, and to maintain our deterrent should they appear, we make sure that we have available the options needed to counter them."

11. Admittedly, these projections are not "intelligence" in the stricter sense because in many instances relating to the farther out future intelligence information is insufficient to support a true judgment. These projections are really only quasi-intelligence. Nevertheless, the intelligence community is the only place where the necessary history, insight, point of view and the fragments of information can be brought together to provide longer range projections for the military planners.

12. The present type of solution involving ranged projections has had and continues to have other fundamental problems. At the present time the National Estimates are to guide the projecting process. This leads to the paradoxical situation wherein the carefully conceived distinction between "estimates" and "projections", between real "intelligence" and quasi-intelligence. If the estimates do not speak definitively and quantitatively to key aspects of future weapons systems (for example, distinguishing possible systems, probably systems, alternative systems and indicating the general timing and level of deployment), the projections are essentially without guidance.

13. On the other hand, if the Board of National Estimates and the USIB are pressed, in effect, to "estimate" what in their judgments can only be "projected" these bodies quite correctly feel they are being driven and constrained by the projections -- that the tail is wagging the dog.

14. This approach, highly integrated with the National Estimate process has its advantages, however. The projections are official, coordinated and concurred in by authority which cannot be ignored. As such, the projections constitute a good base on which to build longer term military plans. The projections are, also, incorporated by reference into the Joint Intelligence Estimates for Planning (JIEP) which is the official departmental basis for planning in DoD by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).

15. Earlier, an approach to the production of projections was made by a special staff (the CIA-DIA Joint Analysis Group) which was highly detached from the National Estimate process and from the production offices as well. The alternative force projections provided by this group were useful to the planner but they lacked authority, and could be

and were all too readily dismissed as academic, theoretical, hypothetical and the like.

16. In sum, the production of intelligence projections for military planning is a difficult task. Its process has been evolving over time but as yet a completely satisfactory project or procedure has not been found.

A Possible Approach

17. There would appear to be a middle ground between the two approaches described above. Essentially, the idea would be to detach the projections somewhat from the National Estimate process and yet retain their inter departmental character by producing them under joint CIA-Defense auspices in lieu of production under USIB auspices.

18. The basic contributions to the projection would continue to be prepared by working groups with membership from the relevant responsible offices of the Community. Coordination would be required. Dissenting views would be registered. It would represent Community views. It would be authorized for publication by the DCI and the Secretary of

Defense (or their delegator) as an intelligence basis for planning for use in conjunction with the National Intelligence Estimates. It would not require detailed USIB guidance, however.

19. Detaching the projections from the necessarily rather formal USIB procedures would also provide the opportunity to tailor the product more closely to various consumer's needs. For example, because of the various phases of the planning cycle, there might be a genuine need to produce two publications each year. One would be related more closely in time to the JCS requirements and timing for the JIEP and the other to the OSD requirements and timing. It would also be possible to experiment more freely in the interest of improving the product; experimenting with the use of the behavioral sciences or delphi methods, simulation techniques and cost-effectiveness analysis, for example.

20. To implement this sort of proposal it is recommended:

a. That the DCI, in conjunction with the Secretary of Defense, establish a CIA/Defense Council for Intelligence Projections.

b. That this Council be responsible for producing interdepartmental intelligence projections for military planning. The Council's functions would include:

- 1) Guidance -- determine concepts, major emphasis and adequacy of scope and level of detail; fix deadlines and responsibilities for contributions.
- 2) Draft and review reports.
- 3) Coordinate reports with CIA and Defense.
- 4) Assemble and incorporate dissenting views in reports.

22. That the Council have five members: a chairman, the Director of the Office of Strategic Research (or his delegate), four other members (full time), two from the Department of Defense, one from the Directorate for Science and Technology and one from the Directorate for Intelligence, and a secretary.

Note: It is envisaged that the Council might organize a board of visitors, as it were, representing consumer interests -- DDR&E, Comptroller, Systems Analysis, JCS and so on. Should the Council prepare projections tailored to support US NATO as background for NATO planning -- this is a gap in US national intelligence -- some additional representation on ~~the~~ board of visitors would be required -- the Bureau of European ^{Affairs} ~~Officers~~, G/PM, Defense Advisor to US NATO and ISA, for example. Approval of the final product by the Secretary of State (or his delegate) would be required which, in turn, would call for expansion of the Council to a CIA/State/Defense Council.

23. The advantages of this proposal seem to be as follows:

- a) To BNE/USIB -- continued control of the projections without compulsion to "estimate" detailed ranges of numbers when it seems unwarranted and without disturbing existing working procedures.
- b) To the consumer (and this may be most important in maximizing the usefulness of the intelligence community's

support to the new administration) -- the less formal Council could identify and respond to changing or emerging new requirements more quickly than the more complex and formal USIB procedures permit; the Council might also experiment more readily, if the necessity arises.

c) To the working level intelligence producer -- the Council could provide guidance to projections more readily than could the Board. The Council could "project" in detail within the general constraints of the Board's Estimates. As required, this projection process could and would, as it probably should, become a rather more iterative process: Council consults Estimates and projects; Working Groups *may* have difficulty phasing ^{some of} the Council's projections; feedback to the Council occurs; Council adjusts projection (within constraints of Estimate) in the light of the difficulty; process repeats.

24. The disadvantage of this approach lies primarily, ~~of~~ not exclusively, in the differences in acceptability between CIA-Defense sponsorship and USIB concurrence -- in either case, dissenting views being registered.

Another Possible Approach

25. Another approach to detaching projections from the estimating process might be to transfer responsibility for projections to the DDI with the DD/ST furnishing support from FMSAC and OSI. The ultimate product would continue, as previously envisaged, to be an intelligence basis for planning for use in conjunction with the National Intelligence Estimates.

26. Again, the basic contribution could continue, ^{or} ~~and~~ at present, to be prepared by working groups with membership from the relevant responsible offices of the Community. The tasks formerly accomplished in ONE -- assembling and drafting the reports for example -- would be done in the DDI, probably in OSR.

27. The crucial question is one of management of the tasking and coordination process. If existing USIB machinery were used, the DDI or, more

likely, the D/OSR or his delegate would, in effect, be an ad hoc member of the Board of National Estimates for projections -- a sort of kicking specialist, a Gogolak. It is easy to see this route leading to complications rather than solutions. The essence of the solution is to separate the production and coordination of projections, quasi-intelligence, from estimates, "intelligence", without, however, substituting projections for estimates.

28. If interdepartmental machinery were to be devised, this would be the Council approach outlined above or a variant thereof.

29. As the other possibility, the DDI with the DD/ST could go it alone: unilaterally produce a draft consistent with the Estimates, circulate the draft for comment, incorporate such comment as appropriate or register it as dissent. The final product could be issued as a DDI-DD/ST document, "national" in that it would incorporate interagency comment/dissent, and offered to the world as "an intelligence basis for planning for use in conjunction with the National Intelligence Estimates."

30. Irrespective of logical, political and psychological merit, such approach is impractical.

CIA does not have the resources nor could it develop them, if it desired, in any reasonable time. The projections need inputs from other military intelligence sources. To be responsible and inspired these sources must be committed to the eventual outcome in a way which requires genuine participation from the outset.